Preventive Force: Untangling the Discourse

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The Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies at the University of Pittsburgh is dedicated to producing original and impartial analysis that informs policymakers who must confront diverse challenges to international and human security. Center programs address a range of security concerns – from the spread of terrorism and technologies of mass destruction to genocide, failed states, and the abuse of human rights in repressive regimes.

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This working paper is one of several outcomes of the Ridgway Working Group on Preemptive and Preventive Military Intervention, chaired by Gordon R. Mitchell.
Speaking triumphantly from the deck of an aircraft carrier in May 2003, President George W. Bush declared, “major combat operations in Iraq have ended. In the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed.” While this optimism drew a predictable response from the live military audience, the credibility of President Bush’s proclamation gradually faded as U.S. forces were drawn into a bloody and costly counter-insurgency campaign that eventually alienated many war supporters. As 2005 drew to a close, rising casualties and spiraling war expenses fueled skepticism of President Bush’s “mission accomplished” message and raised serious doubts about the wisdom of “staying the course in Iraq.” One prominent GOP lawmaker commented, “the White House is completely disconnected from reality,” while other Republicans called on the Bush administration to produce an exit plan. However, as Karl-Heinz Kamp points out, such arguments were drawn narrowly and did not include calls for an overall exit from the U.S. doctrine of first-strike force spelled out in the National Security Strategy of 2002 (NSS 2002).

It is noteworthy that despite the disaster in Iraq, the Bush doctrine of preemptive strike has not been discredited with the American public. Domestic criticism is directed against the developments in Iraq, but not against the idea of anticipatory self-defense. There is essentially no political pressure on the administration to disavow the Bush doctrine.

Perhaps the willingness of war skeptics to spare NSS 2002 from the stinging criticisms levied at Operation Iraqi Freedom is the product of a successful White House effort to establish a rhetorical firebreak between its preventive use of force doctrine and the specific example of the 2003 Iraq War. As part of this effort, then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice stated in 2003 that the United States “would never want to do another Iraq.” In one sense, Rice’s comment stands today as a truism, since ongoing military commitments in Iraq are likely to tie down U.S. forces for the foreseeable future and complicate new missions requiring substantial troop deployments. Assessing how these constraints limit options for further implementation of the Bush administration’s strategic vision, Donald Daniel, Peter Dombrowski and Rodger Payne argue that, “from an operational perspective, the doctrine is presently a dead letter.” Consistent with this analysis is a shift in the tenor of the White House’s approach to foreign policy in President Bush’s second term. Rice raised the status of diplomacy as a tool of U.S. statecraft after her appointment as Secretary of State. According to Guillaume Parmentier, head of the French Center on the United States in Paris, “We Europeans see that Condi Rice has convinced the president that diplomacy should be tried before other means, and as Secretary of State she is pursuing that conviction on a wide variety of issues.”

The Bush administration’s lukewarm approach to negotiations regarding Iran’s controversial nuclear program may simply reflect the fact that Washington is boxed in by a paucity of satisfactory
military options. In Chapter nine of this volume, Peter Dombrowski argues that the U.S. military is unprepared to support the massive post-conflict reconstruction effort that a preventive intervention to oust the Iranian mullahs would entail. Military options on the lower end of the force spectrum appear similarly unpromising. As Dan Reiter shows in Chapter two, Iran has learned the lesson of Osiraq, dispersing and burying its nuclear assets, thus rendering them much less vulnerable to limited preventive strikes.\(^{10}\)

Shortly after release of NSS 2002, commentators asked whether the strategy document was a blueprint to “run the table” and “go all around the Middle East taking over governments.”\(^{11}\) The fact that this has not come to pass can be interpreted as validation for Colin Powell’s argument that critics have “exaggerated both the scope of preemption in foreign policy and the centrality of preemption in U.S. strategy as a whole.”\(^{12}\) However, a different perspective suggests that the lack of recent U.S. first-strike activity may be a temporary lull. In an October 2005 update on the “war on terror,” President Bush re-asserted that, “we’re determined to prevent the attacks of terrorist networks before they occur.”\(^{13}\) Consider also President Bush’s address at the 2005 Naval Academy Commencement, where he recounted his administration’s investment of $16 billion in “transformational military capabilities” that “will help us keep the peace by redefining war on our terms.”\(^{14}\) What are these investments, and how might they “redefine war”? While a comprehensive answer to this question lies beyond the scope of this chapter, a brief discussion of “global strike capability” suggests why technological developments may cause the topic of preventive military force to percolate up the agenda of political discussion sooner rather than later, giving first-strike force a second chance to redeem itself after Operation Iraqi Freedom.

THE ARRIVAL OF GLOBAL STRIKE CAPABILITY

Section three of this volume shows how the utility of preventive military force is constrained by factors including soldier scarcity; the dispersal and hardening of military assets by adversaries; and the need to secure consent from other governments before projecting force. In summer 2004, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld approved a top secret “Interim Global Strike Alert Order,” laying the groundwork for nuclear first-strike attacks that would be largely unencumbered by these constraints.\(^{15}\) Rumsfeld’s order shows that preventive warfare may be higher on the American security agenda than many citizens realize.

A draft document from the U.S. DOD Joint Chiefs of Staff entitled, “Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations,” was posted on a military website in spring 2005. This document proposes that U.S. regional military commanders may seek approval for nuclear first-strikes against adversaries “intending” to use “weapons of mass destruction.”\(^{16}\) According to Hans Kristensen, “The result is
nuclear pre-emption, which the new doctrine enshrines into official U.S. joint nuclear doctrine for the first time, where the objective no longer is deterrence through threatened retaliation but battlefield destruction of targets.”17 After the existence of this planning document was amplified by Jeffrey Lewis,18 it vanished from the DOD website.19 Yet sixteen members of the U.S. Congress still followed up, arguing that the Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations “removes the ambiguity of the previous [1995 version of the] doctrine, and now suggests that your administration will use nuclear weapons to respond to non-nuclear WMD threats and suggests that this use could include pre-emptive nuclear strikes thereby increasing reliance on nuclear weapons.”20

William Arkin explains that “global strike” has become one of the “core missions” for U.S. Strategic Command (Stratcom), a Pentagon agency that traditionally served as the steward of the U.S. nuclear arsenal during the Cold War.21 One result is CONPLAN 8022-02, a Stratcom contingency plan for neutralizing “WMD” threats from North Korea or Iran by combining pinpoint bombing, cyber warfare, and specially-configured earth-penetrating nuclear bombs to destroy deeply buried targets.22 As Arkin notes, “Stratcom established an interim global strike division to turn the new preemption policy into an operational reality.”23 Under the guidance of Admiral James O. Ellis Jr., Stratcom also moved to integrate space assets into its global strike package. As Ellis explained in 2003 congressional testimony:

Space capabilities will dramatically enhance U.S. Strategic Command’s newly assigned global strike mission, which extends our long-standing and globally focused deterrent capabilities to the broader spectrum of conflict. The incorporation of advanced conventional, nonkinetic, and special operations capabilities into a full-spectrum contingency arsenal will enable the command to deliberately and adaptively plan for and deliver rapid, limited-duration, extended-range combat power anywhere in the world.24

General Richard B. Myers, then-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, used the occasion of Admiral Ellis’ July 2004 retirement ceremony to announce that global-strike capability had made major strides:

Jim, the President charged you to “be ready to strike at any moment’s notice in any dark corner of the world.” That’s exactly what you’ve done, and in superb fashion. Within months, you compressed the conventional planning process, and accelerated execution timelines from weeks to days, and in some cases down to only hours. Today we can recognize a threat, develop a plan of action, and execute a mission faster than ever before.25
In the words of a Stratcom concept paper, the “defining characteristic” of global strike is its ability to target the enemy “without resort to large numbers of general purpose forces traditionally associated with major combat operations.” This implicates debates on the wisdom of preventive first-strikes, since as Jeffrey Lewis observes, “Objectors have long derided a strategic posture based on preventive warfare as needlessly provocative in light of the technological futility of the task. Warfighting proponents view space systems as a solution to these objections.”

RECONSIDERING NSS 2002 AFTER IRAQ: DOES ONE BAD APPLE SPOIL THE BUNCH?

According to the Pentagon, the “global strike” capability afforded by “bunker-buster” nuclear bombs and space assets will improve preventive warfare’s prospects for operational success. High technology, on this logic, enables planners to surmount many of the traditional obstacles that constrain attempts to project military force, some of which are discussed by Dombrowski (Chapter nine) and Hymans (Chapter ten). However, one drawback of technical wizardry is what Seyom Brown calls “the illusion of control,” a tendency of military planners to believe that the “polyarchic” nature of international relations can be tamed magically by advanced technology. Such hubris, Brown reasons, is bound to produce unwise decision-making and dubious military misadventures. Similarly, Jeffrey Record warns further that one result of the technology-driven transformation of the U.S. military may be an “increase the incidence of politically sterile military victories,” where ostensibly successful missions contribute little to long-term security. As a counterweight, Brown proposes a set of eight normative guidelines governing use of military force (see Table 6).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Individual Guidelines</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overarching Guideline</td>
<td>1) Keep the threshold between nonviolent diplomacy and war thick and clear.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guidelines Based on Substantive Principles of Decisionmaking</td>
<td>2) Be assured that the interests and values at stake are of sufficient weight – and have sufficient support from the country – to warrant going to war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3) Be convinced in each case that the resort to military force will better serve the interests at stake than will nonmilitary actions.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
4) Be convinced that the harm likely to result from the contemplated war will not exceed the good expected.

5) Be willing to commit the United States to whatever postwar responsibilities and resources will be required to restore at least minimal civic life where it has been severely disrupted by the war.

6) Scrupulously adhere to rules of engagement that prohibit attacks on unarmed civilians, and expand the prohibition to include indirect attacks.

7) Explicitly define and reinforce “firebreaks” between different kinds and levels of warfare, making sure that they are clearly reflected in deployments, strategies, military training manuals, and war games.

8) Integrate guidelines 1 through 7 into both the domestic and international deliberations and decisionmaking processes that play a crucial role in determining whether and how to use force.


Brown’s guidelines dovetail with many findings presented by authors of this volume. For example, guideline one is the logical extension of William Hartung’s call (Chapter eleven) for a “web of preventive measures” that includes treaties, rigorous inspections, and other diplomatic tools, along with military force. Hartung advises that the non-military measures of prevention take precedence in his system of “layered defense.” But to ensure this prioritization, it is necessary to keep the boundaries separating the elements “thick and clear,” as Brown’s overarching guideline stipulates.

Guideline three can be read as a natural counterpart to Thomas Goodnight’s analysis (Chapter five) of how the White House’s “action/inaction” frame for preventive war decision-making generates presumptive momentum toward use of force. Brown’s military/non-military frame acts as a countervailing brake, pushing back the tendency to evaluate the military force option in a
strategic vacuum. It also lays a foundation for the type of intelligence analysis that Thielmann (Chapter eight) says is necessary to remedy the predilection of error-prone analysts to derive alarmist, worst-case projections from the assumption that “doing nothing” becomes the default mode of U.S. policy toward adversaries if force is not used. On another level, guideline five reflects the findings of Dan Reiter’s survey (Chapter two) of preventive attacks, which shows that extensive post-conflict reconstruction is the key factor accounting for the success of previous attempts to neutralize nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programs through preventive invasions that result in regime change.

Guideline eight integrates Brown’s entire set of substantive guidelines into a process of political legitimation conducted through deliberative exchange of viewpoints. Since this normative move resonates deeply with the overall focus of *Hitting First*, further examination of this synergy is in order. One general insight emerging from the analyses in this volume is that the Bush administration’s first-strike force doctrine suffers from intrinsic defects that are likely to become manifest in preventive wars of the future, even if technological innovation succeeds in resolving some of the outstanding operational dilemmas. For example, although Bush administration officials promise that the U.S. will not “do another Iraq,” the legitimation framework set up by the White House to redefine Saddam Hussein as an imminent threat prior to the 2003 Iraq War remains intact. For example, many of the same patterns of argument isolated by Goodnight (Chapter five) and Payne (Chapter six) appear to have been applied in the public debate surrounding Iran’s nuclear program in 2005-2006. Additionally, it has proved difficult to correct the record on Iraq prewar intelligence that Bush administration officials manipulated through what Mitchell and Newman (Chapter four) call “Team B intelligence coups”—political gambits to slant intelligence analysis under the guise of “competitive intelligence exercises.”

In fact, evidence suggests the Bush administration’s antipathy toward public deliberation, documented by Payne in Chapter six, is less a single-case aberration, and more an endemic manifestation of systematic attempts to control public discourse. Consider the appearance of official documents in 2003 that lay out American deception plans: “In a document last autumn, the joint chiefs of staff stressed the need for ‘strategic’ deception and ‘influence operations’ as tools of war. The army, navy and air force have been directed to devise plans for information warfare.” According to Arkin, the Bush approach includes goals for information warfare that pursue “D5E”: “destruction, degradation, denial, disruption, deceit, and exploitation.” While deception has long been recognized as a legitimate tool of psychological warfare to confuse enemies, Arkin notes that the wide array of sites and practices of information control brought under the purview of the Bush
policy “blurs or even erases the boundaries between factual information and news, on the one hand, and public relations, propaganda and psychological warfare on the other.”

The political implications of blurring the boundary that demarcates military strategic deception and public sphere propaganda are significant, given Arkin’s concerns about deception that “while the policy ostensibly targets foreign enemies, its most likely victim will be the American electorate.” This fusion of military deception with media propaganda is what led the Office of Strategic Influence to commission officers from the U.S. Army’s Psychological Operations Command to work as interns in the news division of CNN, and, as noted in Chapter one, also helped turn the U.S. 305th Psychological Operations Company’s PSYOPS mission at Firdos Square on 9 April 2003 into a worldwide propaganda event. When the Office of Strategic Influence’s existence was leaked to reporters in 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld was forced to close the propaganda unit. Yet less than a year later, he stipulated that his action had only been symbolic, and that the same information warfare missions had been shifted to other Pentagon offices:

And then there was the Office of Strategic Influence. You may recall that. And “oh my goodness gracious isn’t that terrible, Henny Penny the sky is going to fall.” I went down that next day and said fine, if you want to savage this thing, fine, I’ll give you the corpse. There’s the name. You can have the name, but I’m gonna keep doing every single thing that needs to be done and I have.

Rumsfeld kept his word. In November 2005, it was disclosed that U.S. Army officials secretly paid Iraqi journalists to publish upbeat stories about American military operations, based on press releases written by U.S. Army psychological warfare experts.

Two words are sufficient to dramatize the ominous security implications of this commitment to strategic deception: Operation Northwoods. As Mitchell and Newman show in Chapter four, Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer’s secret 1962 plan to deceive the American public into supporting a U.S. first-strike on Cuba stands as a sobering exhibit of how the union of strategic deception and preventive warfare can spawn odious policy. While it may be tempting to dismiss the Lemnitzer case as an eccentric aberration, the historical record reflects other instances where apparently saner deception schemes interacted precipitously with the quick trigger of first-strike force.

In 1967, the Soviet Union attempted to inflate the threat of Israeli military mobilizations against Syria. “[T]he evidence pointing to deliberate deception about the supposed Israeli threat to Syria is overwhelming,” explains historian Michael Handel. While this Soviet strategy worked for a time as a pressure tactic against the United States, eventually the campaign to flood Arab newspapers with exaggerated estimates of Israeli troop deployments inadvertently triggered the Six-Day War, by sparking Israeli preemption: “Above all, this example illustrates the difficulty of
controlling a deception operation involving volatile and unstable allies and of knowing where it will lead. The threat to Syria operation is the quintessential runaway deception campaign. It also backfired on the instigator, creating results that were exactly opposite of those desired.”

Payne’s reconstruction (Chapter six) of the “deliberative caveats” embedded in the logic of NSS 2002 illustrates still another way that strategic deception turns the Bush administration’s military doctrine against itself. The concern of NSS 2002’s drafters that the strategy document would be emulated by other states has materialized—Russia, Australia, France, Japan and Indonesia have each followed the U.S. lead and asserted a first-strike prerogative. Whether these states exercise such military options judiciously or use them as “pretexts for aggression” may depend largely on whether they also copy NSS 2002’s “deliberative caveats” requiring political leaders to justify and explain decisions to use preventive force before applying it. But the embrace of deception policies by the White House and Pentagon may seriously undercut the credibility of U.S. diplomats urging restraint by other nations.

**TOPICAL REMEDIES FOR DISCOURSE FAILURE**

Decision-making prior to the 2003 Iraq War was not integrated carefully into the kind of deliberative process Brown recommends. As Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. observes, for many months, “President Bush’s extraordinary reversal of the direction of American foreign policy had little effective opposition, or even debate.” According to Chaim Kaufmann, a “failure of the marketplace of ideas” resulted in breakdown of the U.S. political system’s ability to “weed out exaggerated threat claims and policy proposals based on them.” Peter Neumann and M.L.R. Smith call this phenomenon a “discourse failure,” where “constriction of the language and vocabulary” produces a “failure of comprehension.” How can discourse failure be averted in future situations when decisions on war and peace hang in the balance? Ironically, Brown sees a role here for some of the advanced technologies that facilitate projection of preventive military force:

The technological revolution in communications—paradoxically a source of both greater control and potential loss of control over conflict escalation—is making it possible to slow down the decisionmaking process to ensure that use-of-force issues are given the serious consideration they deserve. It makes it technically feasible for everyone who should be “in the room” to be there when actions of profound consequence for the nation and the world are being considered. It should no longer be acceptable that, because of a presumed lack of time, the crucial technical, political, legal, and ethical implications are not given due attention.
Brown hopes that communication technology can animate his deliberative guideline (see Table 6) by getting everyone “in the room” for prospective discussions on proposed usage of military force. However, as students of deliberative democracy are keenly aware, there is no guarantee that once assembled, interlocutors will deliberate in a manner that pushes leaders to govern responsibly. Indeed, as Kaufmann observes about the 2003 Iraq War case, “careful phrasing of official rhetoric can allow even claims with especially weak evidentiary bases to be persuasive to the public, because often only experts are in a position to parse what certain official statements did and did not say.” In the parlance of rhetorical theory, this dynamic reflects a lack of rhetorical invention on the part of citizens, journalists, and lawmakers—failure to come up with apt lines of argument fitting for the situation.

Since the time of ancient Greece, scholars have worked to understand and explain this challenge of “rhetorical invention.” In his treatise, *On Rhetoric*, Aristotle argued that effective speakers should hold in reserve “selected statements about what is possible and most suited to the subject, and when unexpected problems occur, to try to follow the same method, looking not to the undefined but to what inherently belongs to the subject of the discourse.” His system for helping speakers create arguments “most suited to the subject” centered on the *topoi* (translated into English as “topics” or “commonplaces”). Aristotle created 28 *topoi*, which Eugene Garver describes as “argumentative means of organizing practical domains.” Aristotelian *topoi* are designed to help speakers “identify common lines of argument” that can enrich discussion on “the important subjects on which people deliberate,” including “finances, war and peace, national defense, imports and exports, and the framing of laws.”

As we observed in Chapter one, a key factor differentiating preemptive from preventive warfare situations is that the latter afford time for deliberation before decisions to use force must be made *fait accompli*. Brown’s guidelines lay out a salient set of issues that warrant careful attention in these deliberations (see Table 6). However, as he clarifies, “the guidelines are not specific policy prescriptions or strategies. Rather they are a statement of considerations that are essential to take into account in formulating and executing national security policy.” Left untheorized by Brown is precisely how citizens can best press their leaders to “take into account” these substantive considerations.

In highlighting how government officials leveraged their information monopoly to control public deliberation prior to the 2003 Iraq War, Kaufmann paints a bleak picture of the prospects that U.S. citizens will be able to overcome similar dynamics in future public debates. However, the availability of *dialogue strategies* modeled after Aristotle’s *topics*, may help equalize the playing field. Given the myriad military, political, economic and moral issues implicated in preventive war
decisionmaking, a comprehensive catalogue of salient dialogue strategies could easily fill the pages of another book. Yet it may still be useful to generate a narrowly focused list, one that is tailored to stimulate argumentative creativity in a specific area of public dialogue. This volume isolates one key area of discourse failure during the run-up to Operation Iraqi Freedom that is especially prone to breakdown—deliberation unfolding at the interface where intelligence analyses are converted into evidence and offered as support for public arguments on policy positions. The following pages spell out three dialogue strategies designed to facilitate productive deliberation in future contexts where these dynamics may be in play.

**DIALOGUE STRATEGY #1: SHAKE THE TREE FOR UNPICKED CHERRIES**

In this strategy, participants locate and evaluate the origins of intelligence analysis backing up public arguments advanced to justify preventive warfare. Almost by definition, deliberation regarding proposed use of preventive military force is an exercise fraught with uncertainty, since the purpose of attacking preventively is to forestall threats that have not yet fully materialized, and may possibly never reach fruition. Goodnight (Chapter five) points out how this dynamic creates a thorny dilemma for political leaders seeking political support for preventive war missions: It is difficult to back up arguments for war with definitive evidence when only uncertain or ambiguous intelligence data are at hand. Hartung (Chapter eleven) and Thielmann (Chapter eight) detail how White House officials dealt with this dilemma prior to the 2003 Iraq War, “cherry picking” select data points from various intelligence sources to support claims that Iraq posed a “great and gathering” danger to the US. Similarly, Mitchell and Newman (Chapter four) chronicle ways that the White House circumvented official intelligence channels to convey intelligence directly from Iraqi defectors into administration speeches and statements. As Payne (Chapter six) shows, subsequent investigations revealed many of these “cherry picked” data points to be highly suspect. The magnets thought to be useful for Iraq’s centrifuge program turned out not to have threatening uranium enrichment applications. The key documents alleging that Iraq sought uranium from Niger turned out to be forgeries. Alleged al-Qaida–Iraq ties were based on vanishingly thin reeds of evidence. In fact, later scrutiny exposed the dubious quality of almost every single piece of intelligence data referenced in Colin Powell’s pivotal February 2003 address to the UN.  

As UN Secretary General Kofi Annan indicates, the fallout from these revelations has dealt a significant blow to U.S. credibility: “The bar has been raised. People are going to be very suspicious when one talks to them about intelligence. And they are going to be very suspicious when we try to use intelligence to justify certain actions.” Yet there is a danger here. Taken to the extreme, the suspicious impulse could result in a blind form of hyper-skepticism on the part of audiences
evaluating U.S. claims in preventive war deliberations. Goodnight (Chapter five) and Payne (Chapter six) both point out how this “Chicken Little” effect could jeopardize U.S. security, making it difficult for Washington to act when truly imminent and grave threats materialize.

A more constructive response by those evaluating the merits of U.S. arguments for the preventive military missions of tomorrow would entail locating the specific intelligence analyses employed by government officials to justify use of force, and then folding discussion of these analyses back into ensuing deliberations. While the elaborate classification laws designed to protect confidential “sources and methods” of intelligence gathering often make it difficult for citizens to participate in public debates on the credibility of specific intelligence sources, it may be easier to enter public dialogue at the level of intelligence analysis. Consider the example of Vice President Cheney’s claim on 16 March 2003 that upon invading Iraq, U.S. forces would be “greeted as liberators.”58 Hindsight suggests that this important claim was not based on any co-ordinated intelligence analysis conducted by authorized experts in the U.S. intelligence community, but rather on unofficial defector testimony “stovepiped” to Cheney by Iraqi National Congress chief Ahmad Chalabi.59 One could imagine a series of questions posed to Cheney during the Meet the Press appearance where he made this statement:

• *Is your claim that U.S. forces will be “greeted as liberators” personal opinion, or is it based on co-ordinated intelligence analysis?* (Since arguments for war based on personal conjecture have marginal appeal, this question establishes a burden of proof on the interlocutor to specify a specific intelligence analysis underwriting the substantive claim in question).

• *On what basis do you judge the credibility of intelligence analysis supporting your claim that U.S. forces will be “greeted as liberators”?* (This question isolates the credibility of the relevant intelligence analyses as a topic of deliberation).

• *Have agencies of the U.S. intelligence community conducted any official analyses that assess the strength of intelligence data backing your claim that U.S. forces will be “greeted as liberators”?* (This question opens discussion of the “stovepiping” possibility, couched in a way that can proceed without the interlocutor necessarily being forced to reveal “sources and methods”).

In future settings, deliberators might adapt variants of the above questions as creative tools to focus public discussion on the origins and strength of intelligence analyses backing claims for war (or the fact that supporting intelligence analysis is absent). These lines of argument eschew *ad hominem* attacks designed to neutralize the credibility of government officials, and focus instead on
bringing the substance of specific details regarding the nature of intelligence analysis (not necessarily specific sources) to the surface of public debate.

**DIALOGUE STRATEGY #2: CAST A PEBBLE INTO THE POND**

In this strategy, questioners probe pat characterizations of intelligence community judgments. The official U.S. intelligence community is composed of fifteen separate agencies and entities that each serve different customers and each have distinct approaches to intelligence analysis. On a flow chart, this looks like a disjointed hodgepodge of bureaucracy. But Thielmann argues in Chapter eight that the analytical heterogeneity produced by this structure is actually an important strength of the IC, since it enables consensus judgments to be enriched by the cross-pollination of diverse perspectives. The “Silberman-Robb” Commission, charged by President Bush to investigate the 2003 Iraq War intelligence failure, concurs with Thielmann’s point: “Analysts must readily bring disagreement within the Community to policymakers’ attention, and must be ready to explain the basis for the disagreement. Such disagreement is often a sign of robust independent analysis and should be encouraged.”

The texture of these internal IC debates tends to be flattened when intelligence analysis is converted into evidence for specific policy positions in public argument. In the Iraq case, Thielmann shows that while inter-agency IC debates raged on key points of intelligence analysis undergirding the White House’s case for war, the existence of these debates was hidden in public statements that portrayed consensus IC findings as settled judgments. For example, while the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) viewed Iraq’s importation of aluminum tubes as convincing proof that Saddam Hussein was attempting to reconstitute his nuclear weapons program, Department of Energy (DOE) and Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) analysts strongly disagreed. However, these dissents were muted in public documents summarizing IC views on the matter, and White House statements on aluminum tubes projected an air of certainty.

In a December 2002 press conference, Secretary Powell stated: “We also know that Iraq has tried to obtain high-strength aluminum tubes, which can be used to enrich uranium in centrifuges for a nuclear weapons program.” Here, Powell’s definitive characterization of the intelligence silenced the vigorous dissenting views advanced by INR and DOE, the latter agency being the most technically qualified authority to weigh in on the issue. With few exceptions, most journalists, citizens and members of Congress uncritically accepted Powell’s characterization of the intelligence and would not come to grips with the INR and DOE dissents until after the war, when multiple investigations concluded that the aluminum tubes in question were not intended for uranium
Perhaps events would have unfolded differently if journalists had challenged Powell with probing questions that punctured the smooth veneer of certainty shrouding his statement:

• **Your statement that “we now know” about Iraq’s aluminum tube imports implies that any uncertainty about this technical issue within the official intelligence community has been resolved. Do any official intelligence agencies disagree with your conclusion that the aluminum tubes are suitable for production of nuclear weapons?** (This question pushes for an explicit characterization of the state of debate within the IC. A candid reply would acknowledge the existence of official dissents and open additional lines of argument spelled out in dialogue strategy #3. Conversely, a deceptive answer denying existence of any dissent would provide an opening for relevant IC officials to correct the record).

• **Which intelligence agency has the most technical expertise to analyze whether the aluminum tubes are suitable for uranium enrichment and what is its position on the issue?** (This question highlights the importance of comparing the relative credibility of analyses produced by competing official intelligence entities).

During the rollout of NSS 2002, Bush, Cheney and Powell frequently cited statements from Libyan detainee Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi as “credible evidence” that Iraq was training al-Qaida. Yet their certainty sharply contradicted intelligence reporting by the Defense Intelligence Agency, which warned in a February 2002 document that it was possible that al-Libi “was intentionally misleading the debriefers.” (DIA’s analysis proved correct—al-Libi later recanted). “Just imagine,” Sen. Carl Levin (D-MI) said, “the public impact of that DIA conclusion if it had been disclosed at the time. It surely could have made a difference in the congressional vote authorizing the war.”

A timely and carefully worded question can be the pebble in a pond destabilizing the placid surface projected by political leaders’ pat characterizations of intelligence data. Such questions may have salutary effects, since as William Odom notes, “What initially appears to be an intelligence failure often turns out to have been a failure of interaction between political and military leaders on the one hand and intelligence officials on the other.” Pressure from lawmakers, journalists and citizens could prompt those on both sides of Odom’s divide to pay more attention to the details of these interactions, particularly when it comes to the treatment of uncertainty in intelligence analysis. The need for more careful approaches to these interactions seems apparent in light of post-war revelations that President Bush and then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice were not even aware of the INR/DOE dissents appended to the 2002 NIE on Iraq—”They did not read footnotes in a 90-page document,” a senior White House official told The Washington Post. The Silberman-Robb Commission recently argued that intelligence analysts also have room for improvement on this
count, since accurate and consistent depictions of uncertainty must first be crafted carefully in official IC reporting before they can be injected into the public debate.\textsuperscript{70}

In addition to conveying disagreements, analysts must also find ways to explain to policymakers degrees of certainty in their work. Some publications we have reviewed use numerical estimates of certainty, while others rely on phrases such as “probably” or “almost certainly.” We strongly urge that such assessments of certainty be used routinely and consistently throughout the Community. Whatever device is used to signal the degree of certainty—mathematical percentages, graphic representations, or key phrases—all analysts in the Community should have a common understanding of what the indicators mean and how to use them.\textsuperscript{71}

While the Silberman-Robb commission stops short of suggesting a specific template to standardize characterizations of uncertainty in IC analysis, its findings highlight the need for one in the wake of the Iraq prewar intelligence failure. A possible exemplar comes from Richards Heuer, Jr., who builds on the earlier work of Sherman Kent to fashion a table designed to work as a common reference tool for intelligence analysts and political leaders. This table facilitates translation of “words of estimative probability” into approximate confidence levels, and \textit{vice-versa} (see Table 7).
Table 7
Words of Estimative Probability in Intelligence Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Words of Estimative Probability: Synonym Groups</th>
<th>Confidence Level: Approximate Percentage Range</th>
<th>Confidence Level: Rough Probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Virtually certain”</td>
<td>95 – 99%</td>
<td>Almost certain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“All but certain”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>“Overwhelming odds”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Highly likely”</td>
<td>80 – 94%</td>
<td>Very probable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Highly probable”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Likely”</td>
<td>61 – 79%</td>
<td>Probable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Good chance”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Could go either way”</td>
<td>40 – 60%</td>
<td>Chances about even</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Chances a little better (or less) than even”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Probably not”</td>
<td>21 – 39%</td>
<td>Unlikely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Improbable”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“We doubt”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Small chance”</td>
<td>6 – 20%</td>
<td>Very unlikely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Possibility can’t be excluded”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“We doubt”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Very slight chance”</td>
<td>1 – 5%</td>
<td>Almost certainly not</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DIALOGUE STRATEGY #3: ONLY FOOLS RUSH IN

In this strategy, interlocutors use official acknowledgments of uncertainty to extend time for deliberation and leverage arguments for non-military forms of prevention. There is a good reason why White House officials couched their arguments for war against Iraq in definitive terms such as “there is no doubt in our minds,” “absolutely,” and “there is overwhelming evidence.” The patina of certainty surrounding these phrases helped soften preventive warfare’s political paradox—use of first-strike force only seems like self-defense if there is unequivocal evidence of an imminent threat. When used to counter threats that are vague or uncertain, preventive warfare looks very much like conquest or even naked aggression. Anatol Lieven notes that the American people “are willing—even overwilling—to fight if America is attacked or even insulted, but are not committed to the permanent celebration and projection of military power and values.” This conservative sentiment has potential to work as a natural brake against reckless use of the preventive war option. Hitting first with preventive force is not the same as striking back in retaliation or scrambling to forestall imminent enemy attack. The time available for reflection in preventive war deliberation affords citizens the opportunity to carefully consider threat assessment, efficacy of possible military response, and utility of non-military forms of prevention.

To understand how, consider Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet’s admission of uncertainty in his 7 October 2002 letter to Congress: “Our understanding of the relationship between Iraq and al-Qa’ida is evolving and is based on sources of varying reliability.” As veteran intelligence analyst Ray McGovern explains, “this is intelligence code for ‘Whoa!’” Translating this code effectively into productive outcomes presents a rhetorical challenge, one that can be explored further by considering another example—intelligence analysis of Iraq’s alleged unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program.

During preparation of the 2002 NIE, there was vigorous intra-IC debate not only about the technical specifications of aluminum tubes, but also about the question of whether Iraq’s unmanned aerial vehicle program had threatening weapons applications. Specifically, Air Force Intelligence disagreed with the consensus NIE “key judgment” that Iraq’s UAVs were intended to be used as tools of biological warfare. This was a significant dissent, since as Thielmann notes in Chapter eight, Air Force Intelligence was the agency most technically qualified to comment on the issue. While the specific terms of Air Force’s dissent was omitted from the CIA “White Paper” declassifying portions of the NIE, this public document did obliquely acknowledge the presence of disagreement within the IC regarding the UAV judgment: “Iraq maintains a small missile force and several development programs, including for a UAV that most analysts believe probably is intended to deliver biological warfare agents.”
Here is another example of what McGovern calls “intelligence code for ‘Whoa’”—the sort of caveat that can be coaxed to the surface by pointed questions that flow from dialogue strategies #1 and #2. However, in the absence of follow-on efforts to interpret the meaning of such caveats and explore their implications, the drumbeat of war may simply drown out such expressions of uncertainty. The following lines of argument illustrate how deliberators might have used the official acknowledgment of uncertainty regarding Iraq’s UAV program to extend time for deliberation and leverage arguments for non-military prevention as preferred strategies for dealing with Iraq.

• Before committing to preventive war, we should be sure that Iraqi UAVs pose a grave threat to U.S. security. The greater our uncertainty about this judgment, the more likely our use of force will constitute unprovoked aggression. (This line of argument frames the confidence levels on threat assessments as indicators of whether a proposed preventive attack is more accurately characterized as a legitimate act of self-defense or an opportunistic use of military power).

• Uncertainty about the Iraqi UAV threat is a sign that more time is needed to gather information and deliberate about whether the danger posed to U.S. security justifies preventive use of force. A rush to war based on uncertain evidence turns the U.S. into an aggressor nation that treats violence as a preferred option rather than a last resort. (This line of argument uses the uncertainty of threat assessments to slow down the decision-making process and win more time for intelligence gathering and non-military prevention).

• Non-military measures of prevention can minimize the possible Iraqi UAV threat, while also indemnifying the U.S. against risks that preventive attacks launched on the basis of uncertain intelligence will mistakenly cause unnecessary bloodshed. (This line of argument challenges the assumption that a decision to defer use of force in the face of uncertainty requires the U.S. to passively accept security risks. It emphasizes that non-military strategies of prevention are active security strategies that also provide insurance against downside risks of intelligence failure).

Expressions of uncertainty in official characterizations of intelligence analysis are like yellow traffic lights—they signal a need to proceed with caution. For the most part, the Bush administration’s case for war against Iraq was a series of bright green lights—overconfident summaries of intelligence findings that were largely bereft of caveats or qualifications. However, there were a few instances where Bush administration officials acknowledged the existence of uncertainty in the intelligence assessments upholding their case for war. Unfortunately, the
implications of these qualifiers were not explored robustly in public deliberation, another factor contributing to “discourse failure” prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom. Perhaps deliberators can adapt the preceding dialogue strategies to future use of force discussions and thereby guard against repetition of this error.

CONCLUSION

Lieven notes that episodes of reckless militancy in U.S. history tend to be followed by a return to more tolerant and moderate phases. There is a “self correcting mechanism” that works like a pendulum, swinging American society back to equilibrium after bouts of extremism.78 Is the pendulum broken? Lieven thinks the jury is still out on this question, and the analyses in this volume deliver a mixed verdict. On the one hand, it is clear that the Bush administration’s second-term tilt toward diplomacy as a preferred mode of foreign policy seems to reflect a pullback from the “shock and awe” excesses of Operation Iraqi Freedom. On the other hand, the development of “global strike” capability and the recurrence of argument patterns used to prime audiences for war against Iraq (which resurfaced in discussions of Iran policy) suggest that the White House’s audacious strategy of preventive warfare may have an extended shelf life.

If the White House does attempt to give first-strike force a second chance after the strategy’s checkered debut in the 2003 Iraq War, a key determinant of policy success will likely be the degree to which key players remedy factors that contributed to “discourse failure” in 2002-2003. During that period, breakdown in the marketplace of ideas resulted in widespread support for a preventive war that was legitimated politically as an exercise in self-defense but turned out to be a straightforward instance of aggression against a phantom enemy. Can U.S. citizens learn from this episode and avoid unnecessary loss of blood and treasure in the future? One finds little basis for optimism in the results of a recent psychology study entitled, “Memory for Fact, Fiction, and Misinformation: The Iraq War 2003.”79 That survey of American, German and Australian audiences compared reactions to corrections and retractions of erroneous information about the war presented in major media publications. While German and Australian respondents adjusted their beliefs about Operation Iraqi Freedom when media sources retracted factually incorrect stories, their American counterparts “showed no sensitivity to corrections of misinformation, even when they knew that an event had been retracted.”80 In his study of public debate prior to the 2003 Iraq War, Kaufmann notes a similar phenomenon: “The authority of the White House allows even discredited claims to be repeated with some persuasive effect. Administration officials made use of this frequently during the prewar debate, and some continued to do so after the invasion.”81
These findings are particularly disconcerting, given the crucial role that sound deliberation plays in countering what Goodnight (Chapter five) terms an “inbuilt impetus” within the NSS 2002 doctrine to exaggerate evidence in public debates where proposals to use preventive military force are vetted. Why is this process occurring? One possible explanation may be that American society is fragmenting into multiple public spheres that appear not to interact much with each other. Consider a remarkable poll conducted by political scientist Steven Kull in October 2003. Even after adjusting for viewership and political preference, Kull’s survey found that viewers of Fox News were more likely to hold “misperceptions” such as the belief that “weapons of mass destruction” had been discovered in Iraq and that Saddam Hussein had been “personally involved in 9/11.”82 This same phenomenon was even more pronounced in another poll conducted by Kull just over one year later.83 That survey found wide partisan splits in public opinion about factual issues relating to the 2003 Iraq War. For example, at the time of the survey (shortly after release of the Duelfer report certifying the absence of unconventional weaponry in Iraq), 72% of Bush supporters believed that Iraq had “WMD” prior to war, but only 26% of Kerry supporters believed the same thing. Similarly, 75% of Bush supporters believed that Saddam Hussein was providing “substantial” support for al-Qaida, while just 30% of Kerry supporters held that view.

These wide gaps in public opinion on factual issues may reflect what legal scholar Cass Sunstein calls group polarization: “If certain people are deliberating with many like-minded others, views will not be reinforced, but instead will be shifted to more extreme points.”84 When groups engage in “enclave deliberation”—communicating exclusively with like-minded interlocutors, the polarization effect is heightened. This finding has major implications for the future of preventive warfare in U.S. security strategy. Group polarization may seriously undercut the efficacy of public deliberation as a brake on unnecessary preventive warfare. Enclave deliberation, coupled with group polarization, “shrinks the argument pool”85 and creates a paradox: as members of society communicate more, they grow further apart and become less capable of coming to terms with unfamiliar viewpoints:

If the public is balkanized and if different groups are designing their own preferred communications packages, the consequence will be not merely the same but still more balkanization, as group members move one another toward more extreme points in line with their initial tendencies. At the same time, different deliberating groups, each consisting of like-minded people, will be driven increasingly far apart simply because most of their discussions are with one another.86

A common refrain heard today is that the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 was the result of an intelligence failure—the inability of the official U.S. intelligence community to provide accurate
information to Bush administration officials. Earlier chapters in this volume have brought the incompleteness of this conventional wisdom to light, by elucidating the role of the White House in distorting public argument on Iraq, and by showing how this distortion was facilitated by a public that was unwilling or unable to evaluate specious justifications for war. The dialogue strategies presented in this chapter are heuristic devices designed to illustrate what deliberators might say in future public debates regarding the proposed use of preventive military force. While such lines of argument have potential to help avert recurrence of the 2002-2003 “discourse failure” on Iraq, their impact is likely to be inconsequential without broader transformation of the U.S. political terrain.87

On this front, there are encouraging signs, as well as some promising new ideas for change. As 2005 drew to a close, Michael Massing reported that among journalists, “there is much talk about the need to get back to the basic responsibility of reporters, to expose wrongdoing and the failures of the political system.”88 Can this newfound assertive journalism deliver the sort of information needed to check the American political system’s proneness toward “discourse failure”? The outcome may hinge on the degree to which reporters, editors, and publishers successfully address some of the key “structural problems” that Massing says compromise media’s watchdog function: a reliance on “access,” an excessive striving for balance, an uncritical fascination with celebrities, and a tendency toward self-censorship, “shying away from the pursuit of truths that might prove unpopular, whether with official authorities or the public.”89

The general phenomenon of American “group polarization” further confounds constructive efforts to avert failures in implementation of U.S. security policy. Journalists can only produce the news; what citizens do with the information is another matter. The rise of special interest media “narrowcasting,”90 and the preference of Americans for “enclave deliberation” with like-minded others are trends that create conditions ripe for “opinion cascades,” which tend to reproduce and reinforce extreme, often uninformed, viewpoints. Fortunately, as our understanding of this process improves, new avenues for change emerge. For example, Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson’s study shows how political gerrymandering facilitates enclave deliberation by steadily shrinking the number of competitive House and Senate elections: “As recently as a decade ago, a quarter or more of congressional seats genuinely were in play in any given election. Today, virtually none are. . . . This leaves favored candidates to worry almost exclusively about pleasing their partisans.”91 Hacker and Pierson’s proposed remedies for recovering the lost “middle” in American politics—making election day a national holiday, adopting the British tradition of parliamentary Question Time, opening primaries, and changing the rules governing congressional conference committees—seem far removed from debates about US security policy. Yet the complex dynamics of preventive force decisionmaking elucidated in this volume indicate just how relevant proposals like theirs have
become in the daunting quest to secure a safer world.

2 A giant banner stating “Mission Accomplished” hung as a backdrop for President Bush’s 1 May 2003 speech on the USS Abraham Lincoln.


23 Arkin, “Global Strike Plan.”


30 Rice, quoted in Weisman, “Preemption.”


Following Rumsfeld’s comments, “The Pentagon increased spending on its psychological and influence operations and for the first time outsourced work to contractors. One beneficiary has been the Rendon Group, which won additional multimillion-dollar Pentagon contracts for media analysis and a media operations center in Baghdad, including ‘damage control planning.’ The new Lincoln Group was another winner” (Jeff Gerth, “Military’s Information War is Vast and Often Secret,” *New York Times*, 11 December 2005, A1).


71 U.S. Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities, *Report to the President*, 419.


This point deserves special attention in future deliberations, since hindsight has shown that the combination of IAEA inspections and economic sanctions was far more effective in containing Iraq than Bush administration officials portrayed prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom. See George A. Lopez and David Cortright, “Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 2004); and Hans Blix, Disarming Iraq (New York: Pantheon, 2004).

Lieven, America Right or Wrong, 217.


Kaufmann, “Threat Inflation,” 43.


Cass Sunstein, Republic.com (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2001), 101.

See Sunstein, Republic.com, 68.


Massing, “The Press.”
